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DESTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS BEFORE PROCEEDINGS
COMMENCE: WHAT IS A COURT TO DO?
CAMILLE CAMERON∗ AND JONATHAN LIBERMAN†
[The effective performance by courts of their adjudicative role depends on the availability of
relevant evidence. In civil proceedings, the discovery process aims to ensure that such
evidence is available. If documents that would be relevant evidence in a trial are destroyed, a
fair adjudication is made difficult, if not impossible. This is so whether the destruction of
documents occurs before or after proceedings commence. This article asks what a trial judge
should do in a situation where relevant evidence is unavailable because one of the parties has
destroyed documents before the proceedings commenced but anticipating that such proceedings were highly likely, if not certain, to occur. The authors argue that the criminal test of
attempting to pervert the course of justice (or contempt of court), as laid down in the recent
case of BAT v Cowell, is not the appropriate test because it focuses on the lawfulness of the
destruction rather than on the effect of the destruction on the other party’s ability to obtain a
fair trial. The authors explain what the proper test should be — whether the destruction of
documents has made a fair trial impossible — and identify the factors that should influence a
trial judge’s exercise of discretion in a case where documents have been destroyed.]

I I N T RO D U C T I O N
Courts adjudicate disputes. The essential features of the adjudication process
are determining the facts and applying the law to those facts. The aim of this
judicial process in any given case is to do justice between the parties by finding
the facts and resolving a specific dispute according to law. In order to discharge
their fact-finding and decision-making functions effectively and fairly, courts
need evidence. One of the principal ways in which this evidence is obtained in
the civil litigation process is through the discovery of documents.
Discovery has a long history in common law systems, and the significance and
centrality of the discovery process to the fact-finding and decision-making
processes have long been recognised. The primary aim of discovery is to ensure
that litigants disclose to each other all relevant, non-privileged documents,
whether that disclosure helps or hurts their respective cases, so that they will
know the case they have to meet and judges will have the evidence they need to
do their job effectively. If the process of discovery is subverted by a failure to
provide relevant documents, then the truth-seeking and fact-finding judicial
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functions are also subverted — and perhaps rendered impossible. This subversion can occur as a result of conduct, such as the destruction of documents, that
takes place either before or after proceedings are commenced.
The recent Victorian Court of Appeal decision in British American Tobacco
Australia Services Ltd v Cowell (as Representing the Estate of Rolah Ann
McCabe, Deceased)1 has, in determining how courts should respond to the
destruction of documents that occurs prior to the commencement of proceedings,
made new law. The Court of Appeal stated that the pre-proceedings destruction
of documents could attract the court’s intervention (beyond the drawing of
adverse inferences) only if the destruction amounted to an attempt to pervert the
course of justice or contempt of court. The Court of Appeal thus borrowed
directly from the criminal law, except to the limited extent that the burden of proof
on the party complaining about the pre-proceedings destruction of documents
would be to establish the required intent on the balance of probabilities rather
than beyond reasonable doubt.
In the authors’ view, the Court of Appeal erred by characterising the issue of
pre-proceedings destruction of documents in civil proceedings as one about
sanctions for destruction. The pre-proceedings destruction of documents should
be viewed, in civil proceedings, not from the perspective of the state of mind of
the person destroying the documents, or the legality of their conduct, but from
the perspective of the impact of the document destruction on the fact-finding,
truth-seeking and decision-making functions of the court, and on the capacity of
litigants to have their specific dispute determined.
Part II of this article begins with a description of the judicial decision-making
function in civil proceedings. It then analyses the nature of discovery and
describes how civil discovery facilitates the judicial fact-finding and decisionmaking process. The authors explain how the fundamental principles of civil
discovery can shed light on issues raised by the pre-proceedings destruction of
documents. Part III analyses how these issues arose in BAT v Cowell. The
authors argue that the Court of Appeal mistakenly focused on the lawfulness of
the defendant’s conduct and the right of the defendant to deal with its documents, rather than on what the consequences of the pre-proceedings destruction
of documents should be. In Part IV, the authors analyse the criminal test of
attemp ting to pervert the course of justice (or contempt of court) and explain why
that offence is inappropriate and unsuited to determining what the consequences
of the pre-proceedings destruction of documents should be in civil proceedings.
The authors argue that such a test focuses, incorrectly, on whether the destruction was lawful rather than on its impact on the fairness of the trial. Part V
consists of a detailed analysis of cases in which courts have considered what the
consequences should be where relevant documents are destroyed or otherwise
made unavailable. The authors argue that while these cases dealt with documents
destroyed or otherwise made unavailable in the post-commencement stage, the
test adopted in those cases — whether the destruction or unavailability of the
documents has made a fair trial impossible — is also the test that should be
applied where relevant documents are destroyed in the pre-commencement stage.
1

[2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6 December 2002)
(‘BAT v Cowell’). The Court delivered a joint judgment.

Finally, in Part VI, the authors reiterate the correct question, set out what they
consider to be the appropriate test — whether the destruction of the documents
has made a fair trial impossible — and state the factors that should influence a
court’s exercise of discretion in applying that test.
II T H E RE L A T I O N S H I P B E T W E E N A DJUDICATION AND D ISCOVERY
A The Essential Elements of Adjudication: Finding Facts and Making
Decisions
Judicial power has been defined as ‘the power which every sovereign authority
must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between
itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property.’2 The
quintessential example of the exercise of this power is the ‘adjudication of
dis putes about rights and obligations arising from the operation of the law upon
past events or conduct’.3 Thus courts both determine matters of fact — ‘past
events or conduct’ — and law, and then apply the law to the facts.4 The determination of facts is thus an essential part of the judicial process of ‘deciding
controversies’ between litigating parties.
B The ‘First Principles’ of Discovery
In civil disputes, the discovery process assists courts to perform this adjudicative function. Discovery makes available to parties the relevant, non-privileged
documents 5 in the possession, custody or power of an opponent.6 Without the
assistance of discovery, parties and courts would not have access to this relevant
information, thus greatly restricting the ability of the court to determine ‘past
events or conduct’7 (that is, the facts), to apply the appropriate law to those facts
and to reach a decision. A consideration of the history and development of the
law and procedure regarding discovery confirms that one of its fundamental aims
is to facilitate the fact-finding and decision-making role of the court.
1

Discovery in Equity

While the origins of discovery can be traced to the civilian courts,8 it came into
its own in the Court of Chancery.9 Discovery could be used in Chancery for the
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Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ).
Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167, 188 (Mason CJ, Brennan,
Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) (emphasis added).
‘[T]he process to be followed must generally be an inquiry concerning the law as it is and
the facts as they are, followed by an application of the law as determined to the facts as
determined’: R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970)
123 CLR 361, 374 (Kitto J).
The term ‘documents’, when used in this article, picks up the broad definition that is now
commonly used in courts. Section 38 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic)
defines ‘document’, for the purposes of all Victorian statutes and subordinate legislation,
to include not only a document in writing but also any book, map, plan, graph, drawing,
photograph, descriptive label, and any disc, tape, soundtrack, film or other device from
which data can be reproduced.
See, eg, Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996 (Vic) O 29.
Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167, 188.
Paul Matthews and Hodge Malek, Discovery (1992) 6.

examination of witnesses and to order parties to produce documents, either in a
suit in Chancery or to assist a common law action.10 The frequent use of discovery in Chancery to assist a common law action was a result of evidence-gathering
deficiencies in the common law courts. These included a prohibition against
parties giving evidence and the inability of the common law courts to order
disclosure of documents.11 The common law courts possessed only very limited
rights of discovery;12 it was only by resort to the Court of Chancery that a party
could obtain any general right of discovery. The result of this robust assistant
jurisdiction and the willingness of Chancery to use it was an extensive survey of
the evidence.13 It was acknowledged that the main purpose and benefit of this
evidence-gathering function of discovery was to reveal the truth:
According to the general rule which has always prevailed in this Court,
every Defendant is bound to discover all the facts within his knowledge,
and to produce all documents in his possession which are material to the
case of the Plaintiff … The Plaintiff being subject to the like obligation, on
the requisition of the Defendant in a cross-bill, the greatest security which
the nature of the case is supposed to admit of is afforded, for the discovery
of all relevant truth, and by means of such discovery, this Court, notwithstanding its imperfect mode of examining witnesses, has, at all times, proved
to be of transcendent utility in the administration of justice. It need not be
observed, what risks must attend all attempts to administer justice, in cases
where relevant truth is concealed, and how important it must be to diminish those risks … 14
That this Chancery process of discovery was known as ‘scraping the defendant’s conscience’15 confirms its primary function as a way to do justice between
the parties by revealing the true facts of the case.16
2

Modern Discovery
The truth-seeking purposes of discovery in the Court of Chancery continue to
be a cornerstone of the modern discovery process. In addition to this truthseeking function, early commentaries and cases show that parties were entitled to
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See, eg, J H Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (3 rd ed, 1990) ch 6; W J
Jones, The Elizabethan Court of Chancery (1967).
Matthews and Malek, above n 8, 6–7; Jones, above n 9, 455–7. Jones notes that
discovery, along with recovery and restraint, accounted for the largest and one of the
most important sections of Chancery business: at 455.
Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (first published 1924, 3rd ed, 1945) vol
5, 281.
Edward Bray, The Principles and Practice of Discovery 1885 with Bray’s Digest of
Discovery, 1910 (1985) 4.
Jones, above n 9, 455.
Flight v Robinson (1844) 8 Beav 22, 37; 50 ER 9, 15 (Lord Langdale MR) (emphasis
added). The issue in dispute was whether various classes of documents were protected by
legal professional privilege. The Court decided that some were so entitled, but ordered the
defendant to disclose the remaining classes of documents to the plaintiff.
Augustine Birrell, ‘Changes in Equity, Procedure, and Principles’ in Roy Mersky and
Myron Jacobstein (eds), A Century of Law Reform: Twelve Lectures on the Changes in the
Law of England during the Nineteenth Century (1901) 177, 186.
Birrell describes the process of scraping the defendant’s conscience by requiring a party to
answer interrogatories on oath ‘and such answer admitted … some of your alleged facts
and disputed others, and thus threw light on the real truth of the case’: ibid. Blackst one
refers to the circumstances in which ‘a court of equity applies itself to [a party’s] conscience, and purges him upon oath with regard to the truth of the transaction’: Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (15 th ed, 1809) vol 3, 436–7.

discovery in order to avoid the expense and delay that would result if they had to
look for the documents themselves.17 Inclusion of discovery in the postJudicature Acts18 rules of civil procedure was intended to reflect and advance the
philosophy behind the Judicature Acts, especially to simplify procedure, to avoid
trial by ambush and to increase the prospect of a court deciding a matter on the
merits rather than on a technicality.19 Among the potentially beneficial attributes
of the modern common law discovery process are: it assists the parties to prepare
for trial; it facilitates settlement; it can (but often does not) reduce time and
expense and provide relief for overcrowded court dockets;20 it may result in
narrowing the issues in dispute; and it ‘may prevent a party being taken by
surprise at trial and enable the dispute to be determined upon its merits rather
than by mere tactics’.21
In Davies v Eli Lilly & Co,22 Lord Donaldson MR gave what has become one
of the most oft-quoted descriptions of the modern common law process of civil
discovery. He said:
The right [to discovery] is peculiar to the common law jurisdictions. In plain
language, litigation in this country is conducted ‘cards face up on the table’.
Some people from other lands regard this as incomprehensible. ‘Why’, they
ask, ‘should I be expected to provide my opponent with the means of defeating me?’ The answer, of course, is that litigation is not a war or even a game.
It is designed to do real justice between opposing parties and, if the court
does not have all the relevant information, it cannot achieve this object.23
These comments confirm that the attempt of the Court of Chancery to ‘scrape the
defendant’s conscience’ so as to do justice between the parties by ensuring that
they, and the court, have access to all relevant information, has survived as a
cornerstone of the modern process of discovery.
C Adjudication, Discovery and the Pre-Proceedings Destruction of Documents
Though the process of discovery of documents does not begin until after
proceedings have been commenced, their destruction prior to the commencement
of proceedings can have just as damaging an effect on the courts’ powers to
adjudicate disputes as their destruction after those proceedings have been
commenced. Rare is the case in which a party that has acted unlawfully, or
breached a legal obligation, will have no inkling that proceedings may, at some
stage, be filed against it. It would greatly undermine the purpose of discovery,
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Bray, above n 12, 1–2. Bray’s survey of cases reminds us that one of the chief purposes of
discovery is to obtain admissions from parties of the case against them. This has both a
truth-seeking and a time-saving function.
Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (Imp) 36 & 37 Vict, c 66; Supreme Court of
Judicature Act (Imp) 38 & 39 Vict, c 77.
Bernard Cairns, The Law of Discovery in Australia: Documents, Interrogatories and
Property (1984) 1.
There are many (some would say too many) examples of cases in which interlocutory
discovery skirmishes have greatly increased the cost of litigation and delayed a consideration of the real issues in dispute. For a striking example, see B T (Australasia) Pty Ltd v
New South Wa les [1997] FCA 1553 (Unreported, Sackville J, 24 December 1997).
Shane Simpson, David Bailey and Evan Evans, Discovery and Interrogatories (2 nd ed,
1990) 2.
[1987] 1 All ER 801.
Ibid 804 (emphasis in original).

and the crucial function it serves in the adjudication of disputes, if the time prior
to the commencement of proceedings were seen as a window of opportunity to
destroy documents that would be required to be discovered once proceedings
had been filed. One might therefore expect courts to take a strong stance in cases
where the pre-proceedings destruction of documents has impaired their capacity
to exercise their powers. The preservation of the integrity of court proceedings
depends substantially on their so doing.
III H O W T HESE I SSUES A ROSE IN BAT V C OWELL
A Introduction
These issues arose for consideration last year in the Supreme Court of Victoria
in McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd.24 The plaintiff,
Rolah Ann McCabe, a 51 year old woman dying of lung cancer had sued the
defendant tobacco manufacturer (‘BAT’) in negligence.25 On 22 March 2002, the
trial judge, Eames J, struck out BAT’s defence to the proceeding and ordered
judgment for Mrs McCabe, after finding that ‘the process of discovery in this
case was subverted by the defendant and its solicitor … with the deliberate
intention of denying a fair trial to the plaintiff, and the strategy to achieve that
outcome was successful.’26 His Honour found that it was an outcome that could
not ‘now be cured so as to permit the trial to proceed on the question of liability.’27 The subversion of the process of discovery had, according to Eames J,
involved the deliberate destruction of thousands of relevant documents to keep
them from prospective plaintiffs such as Mrs McCabe; misleading the court about
what had become of the missing documents; and the ongoing ‘warehousing’28 of
documents to keep them from the court. Eames J sent the case to trial before a
jury solely on the issue of quantum of damages. On 11 April 2002, the jury
awarded Mrs McCabe $700 000.29
BAT appealed against Eames J’s decision, and the Court of Appeal (Phillips,
Batt and Buchanan JJA) unanimously allowed its appeal.30 In its decision, the
Court overturned a number of Eames J’s major findings of fact and conclusions.
The plaintiff’s daughter, representing her estate, has filed an application for
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[2002] VSC 73 (Unreported, Eames J, 22 March 2002) (‘McCabe v BAT’).
The plaintiff’s allegations included that the defendant ‘knew that cigarettes were addictive
and dangerous to health, and by its advertising targeted children to become consumers’
and, ‘knowing the dangers of addiction and to health of consumers, took no reasonable
steps to reduce or eliminate the risk of addiction or the health risks, and ignored or publicly disparaged research results which indicated the dangers to health of smoking’: ibid
[7], adopted by the Court of Appeal in BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported,
Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6 December 2002) [20].
McCabe v BAT [2002] VSC 73 (Unreported, Eames J, 22 March 2002) [385].
Ibid.
Ibid [324]. Eames J described ‘warehousing’ as the tactic of having third parties hold
documents relevant to issues in the trial so that those documents would be available to be
called on to rebut the plaintiff’s witnesses or to be used by the defendant’s witnesses,
whilst not being required to be discovered by the defendant because they would be said not
to be under its possession, custody or power.
BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6
December 2002) [1].
Ibid [13], [192]. The decision was handed down approximately six weeks after the
plaintiff passed away.

special leave to appeal to the High Court against the Court of Appeal’s decision.
That application will be heard on 3 October 2003.31
B The Undisputed Facts in McCabe v BAT
While numerous factual issues remain in dispute between the parties, these are
essentially irrelevant to a consideration of the issues of legal principle explored in
this article. The facts relevant to these issues of legal principle are undisputed.32
They are as follows.
1

Anticipation of Litigation
At all times between November 1990 and March 1998, litigation against the
defendant concerning smoking-related disease was underway in at least one
Australian jurisdiction. While such litigation was on foot, the defendant imposed
what it called ‘hold orders’, preventing the destruction of documents under the
defendant’s internal policies which regulated the retention and destruction of
documents.33 In March 1998, the final hold order was revoked in consequence of
the end of the then current litigation in Australia.34 It was not disputed before the
Court of Appeal that, at this time, ‘litigation could still be anticipated of the sort
now brought by the plaintiff in this instance, litigation, that is, by a smoker
complaining that her ill health was a direct result of misconduct on the part of one
tobacco company or another.’35 Eames J had put the matter somewhat higher: ‘the
31
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On 25 July 2003, the Victorian Attorney-General, Rob Hulls, announced that he would
seek leave to intervene in the plaintiff’s special leave application. The announcement
followed allegations made in an affidavit by Mr Frederick Gulson, a former in -house counsel for W D & H O Wills Ltd (BAT’s predecessor), that the purpose behind BAT’s ‘document retention policy’ was to ‘get rid of all the sensitive documents but to do so under the
guise of an innocent housekeeping arrangement and to ensure that all relevant documents
that were not destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction were properly (legally) priv ileged’: see William Birnbauer, ‘Tobacco Insider Tells of Files “Cull”’, The Age (Melbourne), 19 July 2003, 1. On 1 A ugust 2003, the Attorney-General welcomed the decision
of the New South Wales government to intervene, noting that ‘[t]he fact that two major
states are involved confirms that the case is of national significance and raises clear and
important issues that go to the integrity of the legal system and its processes’: Rob Hulls,
‘Hulls Welcomes NSW Decision to Join Tobacco Case’ (Press Release, 1 August 2003).
This article does not deal with the other major issues dealt with by the Court of Appeal,
including whether the defendant had impliedly waived privilege over certain documents
and what should follow from the defendant’s specific failures to comply with orders for
discovery. The approach adopted by the Court of Appeal treated questions relating to the
pre-proceedings destruction of documents as independent of these other issues.
Eames J had been careful to base his striking out of the defence on grounds that included
— but were not limited to — the destruction of documents. However, after the Court of
Appeal had overturned a number of his Honour’s findings and conclusions relating to these
other grounds, it considered the pre-proceedings destruction of documents as a discrete
issue. This approach conveniently isolated and identified a fundamental issue of principle
requiring resolution. In particular, the Court’s articulation of the relevant principles was
not affected by the question whether particular documents ought to have been admissible
over the defendant’s claim of privilege.
BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6
December 2002) [26]; McCabe v BAT [2002] VSC 73 (Unreported, Eames J, 22 March
2002) [61].
BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6
December 2002) [136]; McCabe v BAT [2002] VSC 73 (Unreported, Eames J, 22 March
2002)
[127]–[128].
BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6
December 2002) [136].

defendant considered that further proceedings were not merely likely, but a near
certainty’.36
2

Destruction of Documents
Upon the lifting of the hold order in 1998, thousands of documents were destroyed by the defendant. Eames J found that in March 1998, at the conclusion of
litigation brought by Phyllis Cremona, another negligence proceeding in which
BAT was a defendant, it destroyed thousands of documents which had been
discovered as relevant in that case.37 He also found that this destruction was
performed ‘as a matter of urgency.’38 These findings were not disturbed on
appeal. The Court of Appeal stated:
Perhaps the best example of what happened in March–April 1998 was the
destruction of documents which had been discovered in the Cremona litigation, a step which obviously impressed itself upon the judge. In that litigation, general discovery had been required and, as already described by reference to Mr Maher’s [a former in-house counsel at BAT] affidavit, the task
of discovery for the defendant was enormous, very costly and in the end
not very productive for the plaintiff … [A]n image of some 30 000 documents was placed on computer discs and, in addition, documents were indexed and in most instances summarised for easier retrieval … [T]he documents had also been rated on the scale of 1 to 5, according to how damaging
each was likely to be to the defendant in any litigation, or how beneficial. All
records of the summaries and rating of the documents had, however, been
destroyed before the commencement of the present litigation and it was this
which impressed the judge. … Not only were the documents discovered in
the Cremona litigation destroyed, at least in the main, so too was the database, denying the defendant the ability to describe the documents in question.39
Thus, there is no dispute that in March and April of 1998:
(a) BAT destroyed thousands of documents — both hard copy and electronic
— that were, or may have been, relevant to Mrs McCabe’s proceeding, as
well as records of such documents; and
(b) BAT destroyed such documents at a time when it anticipated that proceedings such as those ultimately commenced by Mrs McCabe would be
brought against it.
C Destruction of Documents when Litigation Is Anticipated: The Court of
Appeal ‘Test’
These undisputed facts gave rise to the following issue: in what circumstances,
and in what ways, may a court intervene in a civil proceeding that has been
affected by the pre-proceedings destruction of documents? The Court of Appeal
held that ‘intervention’ by the court, otherwise than by the drawing of adverse
36
37

McCabe v BAT [2002] VSC 73 (Unreported, Eames J, 22 March 2002) [289].
Ibid. When the Cremona and Harrison cases (David Harrison had commenced proceedings
in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 1991) were discontinued in March 1998, it
marked the first time since 1990 that no litigation against the defendant concerning
smokin g-related disease was on foot in any Australian jurisdiction: at [58]–[59].
38 Ibid [289].
39 BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6
December 2002) [140] (citations omitted).

inferences from the fact of destruction, in circumstances where there has been
destruction of documents by the defendant, prior to the filing of the proceeding
by the plaintiff, at a time when the defendant anticipated litigation of the kind
brought by the plaintiff, and where that destruction of documents has caused
prejudice in the proceeding to the plaintiff, could only be justified where the
plaintiff established that the destruction of documents constituted the criminal
offence of an attempt to pervert the course of justice or a contempt of court, to be
proved to the civil standard of proof.40
Accordingly, there being no authority directly in point, we consider that this
court should state plainly that where one party alleges against the other the
destruction of documents before the commencement of the proceeding to the
prejudice of the party complaining, the criterion for the court’s intervention
(otherwise than by the drawing of adverse inferences, and particularly if the
sanction sought is the striking out of the pleading) is whether that conduct of
the other party amounted to an attempt to pervert the course of justice or, if
open, contempt of court occurring before the litigation was on foot.41
D The Correct Question
Sitting as a trial judge in a negligence proceeding, Eames J had to determine
how, in the proceeding before him, to deal with the defendant’s destruction of
relevant material prior to the commencement of the anticipated proceedings. As
the trial judge, his task was (with the assistance of a jury, which had been
requested by the defendant) to adjudicate a ‘dispute about rights and obligations
arising from the operation of the law upon past events or conduct’.42 That task
was made more difficult by the destruction of a large volume of material by the
defendant. That difficulty was relevant because it affected his capacity, and that
of the jury, to do their jobs in the particular case. While he chose as his criterion
for intervention (beyond drawing adverse inferences) his capacity to do justice
40

The defendant argued that the only consequence which might follow in the proceeding
from the destruction of documents in these circumstances was the drawing of adverse
inferences against it. That is to say that inferences might be drawn, in appropriate circumstances, to the effect that the docum ents that had been destroyed would not have
been helpful to the defendant’s case. Because Eames J had struck the defence out, the issue
before the Court of Appeal related to the correctness of the striking out. Accordingly, the
question relevant to the Court of Appeal related to intervention ‘beyond the drawing of
adverse inferences’, as the Court described it: ibid [175].
41 Ibid (emphasis in original). See also the Court’s statement, in similar terms (at [173])
(citations omitted):
As indicated at the out set, it seems to us that there must be some balance struck between
the right of any company to manage its own documents, whether by retaining them or
destroying them, and the right of the litigant to have resort to the documents of the
other side. The ba lance can be struck, we think, if it be accepted that the destruction of
documents, before the commencement of litigation, may attract a sanction (other than
the drawing of adverse inferences) if that conduct amounts to an attempt to pervert the
course of justice or (if open) contempt of court, meaning criminal contempt (inasmuch
as civil contempt comprises wilful disobedience of a court order and will ordinarily be
irrelevant prior to the commencement of proceedings). … Certainly, there can be an
attempt to pervert the course of justice before a proceeding is on foot, as R v Rogerson
demonstrates, and that, we think, provides a satisfactory criterion in the present instance. The standard of proof is the civil rather than the criminal standard, bearing in
mind also the seriousness of the allegation as required by Dixon J in Briginshaw v
Briginshaw.
42 Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167, 188. See the earlier discussion
of judicial power in Part I.

between the parties, the Court of Appeal chose as the criterion for the court’s
intervention whether the documents were destroyed in an attempt to pervert the
course of justice or in criminal contempt of court. Eames J’s approach related the
issues raised by the destruction of documents directly to the exercise of judicial
power which he was called upon to perform in the case before him. The Court of
Appeal’s approach did not.
In the authors’ view, the legal question properly before the Court of Appeal was
this:
What consequences should, or may, follow, in a civil proceeding, from the
destruction of documents by the defendant, prior to the filing of the proceeding by the plaintiff, at a time when the defendant anticipated litigation
of the kind brought by the plaintiff, and where that destruction of documents has caused prejudice in the proceeding to the plaintiff? And, in particular, can such destruction of documents justify an order striking out the
defendant’s defence, or parts of the defendant’s defence?
The fundamental difference between this question and the question asked by
the Court of Appeal is that the Court of Appeal focused on the lawfulness of the
defendant’s conduct rather than on the effect of the document destruction on the
court’s ability to exercise judicial power by finding the facts, applying the law to
those facts and reaching a just decision. That the Court of Appeal saw its task in
very different terms can be seen as early as the first paragraph of the section of
the Court’s judgment dealing with the pre-proceedings destruction of documents,
where the Court, in introducing what it saw as the issues before it, said:
Next, we turn to the vexed question of the obligation, if any, imposed upon a
company in the position of the defendant with respect to the retention of
documents before the proceeding to which it is made party has been commenced but at a time when such a proceeding can reasonably be anticipated.43
However, the ‘vexed question’ for the Court was not primarily one about the
obligation of a party ‘with respect to the retention of documents’ prior to the
commencement of proceedings. Rather, it was about what should, or may, follow,
in the present case (and similar cases), from the fact that the defendant had
destroyed relevant documents prior to the commencement of proceedings. The
issue was not primarily about breach of an obligation with respect to the retention
of documents by the defendant. Rather, it was about doing justice between the
parties in the specific case before the Court.
The dispute was one about personal injury allegedly caused by the defendant’s
negligence. It would therefore have been proper to speak of breaches by the
defendant of obligations or duties owed to the plaintiff, such as the duty to take
reasonable care for her safety. Indeed, it was the dispute about such obligations
(and their corresponding rights) that Eames J was called upon to adjudicate. But
the hearing before the Court of Appeal concerned only issues relating to the
evidence that was relevant, or potentially relevant, in the proceeding. This was
because, by the time the case reached the Court of Appeal, Eames J had ordered
judgment for the plaintiff without a trial on the substantive issues, and it was this
decision that was before the Court of Appeal. The primary proceeding had
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BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6
December 2002) [136].

receded somewhat into the background when the issues were argued on appeal,
and this may have influenced the way in which the Court viewed the dispute
before it.
In the authors’ view, the Court of Appeal’s failure to keep in mind the nature of
the real controversy that was before Eames J, and before the Court of Appeal
itself — the dispute about rights and obligations that was required to be adjudicated in a negligence proceeding between a plaintiff and a defendant — led it to
misconceive the nature of the task with which it was faced and to view the
primary question as ‘what was the obligation of the defendant with respect to its
documents?’, rather than the real question, ‘what should happen in the proceeding between the plaintiff and the defendant, given that documents had been
destroyed by the defendant?’ This is much more than a technical or semantic
distinction. In the authors’ view, it goes to the heart of the Court of Appeal’s error
in this case.
E The Court’s Use of the Terms ‘Obligation’, ‘Sanction’ and ‘Right’
1

The Court’s Use of the Term ‘Obligation’

‘Obligation’ is defined as ‘a binding requirement as to action; duty’.44 A ‘requirement’ is ‘that which is required; a thing demanded or obligatory’.45 If the
court were dealing with a charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice, or
contempt of court, it would have been appropriate to speak of a party’s ‘obligation’ with respect to the retention of documents. But that was not the case before
the Court. The issue was what should, or could, have been the consequences of
the destruction of documents, given its impact on the case before the Court.
The fact that consequences adverse to the defendant’s interests, such as the
striking out of its defence, or parts of its defence, may follow in a civil proceeding
from the pre-proceedings destruction of documents does not necessarily mean
that the defendant has an obligation to retain the documents. If adverse consequences may follow from certain conduct, a party may have an incentive or a
reason not to engage in that conduct. But that is quite different from saying that
it has an obligation not to engage in that conduct. It may also have an obligation not to engage in the conduct, but t hat obligation does not arise from the fact
that adverse consequences may follow in the civil proceeding. It can arise only
out of a law or rule which imposes such an obligation.46
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Arthur Delbridge et al (eds), Macquarie Dictionary (3 rd revised ed, 2001) 1321.
Ibid 1606.
That the Court viewed the issue as one of obligation is confirmed by further statements in
BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6 December 2002): ‘for the moment we are dealing only with whether a company, in the position
of the defendant, is obliged to retain documents when litigation is not on foot but can be
anticipated’: at [141]; ‘we turn to the critical question, whether there is any obligation on
the defendant, before the commencement of proceedings, not to destroy documents
which might well be relevant in future litigation when such litigation can reasonably be
anticipated’: at [142]; and in its conclusion: ‘Nor, in our view, was the defendant shown to
be in breach of any relevant obligation not to destroy documents before the commencement of the proceeding, given that the plaintiff did not rest her case on either an attempt
to pervert the course of justice or contempt of court’: at [191].

2

The Court’s Use of the Term ‘Sanction’
The Court’s approach is also apparent in its imprecise use of the word ‘sanction’ to describe the consequences (beyond the drawing of adverse inferences)
that may follow from the pre-proceedings destruction of documents. The Court
said:
The balance can be struck, we think, if it be accepted that the destruction of
documents, before the commencement of litigation, may attract a sanction …
if that conduct amounts to an attempt to pervert the course of justice or (if
open) contempt of court.47
‘Sanction’ is defined as ‘a provision of a law enacting a penalty for disobedience.’48 This is a term better suited to a criminal proceeding in which a party is
charged with attempting to pervert the course of justice or contempt of court by
destroying documents in anticipation of proceedings than it is to a civil proceeding between two parties in relation to personal injury, where one party has
destroyed documents in a way that makes it harder, if not impossible, for the other
party to prove its case. The former is a case in which a law prohibiting certain
conduct — attempting to pervert the course of justice or contempt of court — is
applied. The sanction which gives practical effect to the law is the punishment of
the offender and is imposed if the charge is proved. The latter is a case in which
justice should be done between two parties; it is not concerned with imposing
sanctions upon either of the parties. Consequences are not the same as sanctions. And the fact that they may be consequences which fall against a party’s
interests does not make one into the other.
3

The Court’s Use of the Term ‘Right’
The Court’s approach is also evident in its framing of the issue as one of striking a balance between competing rights to manage and to have access to
documents.49 Undoubtedly, the Court is correct; such a balance must be struck.
But again, the idea of that balance being struck is more appropriately dealt with in
the context of criminal offences relating to the pre-proceedings destruction of
documents than it is in the context of a civil proceeding for personal injury.
Deciding what consequences should follow in a civil proceeding from a party’s
pre-proceedings destruction of documents is not primarily about striking a
balance between the right of one party to manage its own documents and the
right of the other to have resort to them. It is about doing justice between the
parties in the specific case before the court.
47

Ibid [173]. The Court later stated (at [175]) (italics in original, underlining added):
Accordingly, there being no authority directly in point, we consider that this cour t
should state plainly that where one party alleges against the other the destruction of
documents before the commencement of the proceeding to the prejudice of the party
complaining, the criterion for the court’s intervention (otherwise than by the drawin g
of adverse inferences, and particularly if the sanction sought is the striking out of the
pleading) is whether that conduct of the other party amounted to an attempt to pervert
the course of justice or, if open, contempt of court occurring before the lit igation was
on foot.
48 Delbridge et al, above n 44, 1672.
49 The Court said in BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and
Buchanan JJA, 6 December 2002) that ‘there must be some balance struck between the
right of any company to manage its own documents, whether by retaining them or destroying them, and the right of the litigant to have resort to the documents of the other
side’: at [173].

The word ‘right’ is defined as ‘a just claim or title, whether legal, prescriptive, or
moral.’50 Again, this is an appropriate word in the context of sanctions (a provision of a law enacting a penalty for disobedience), but not where the issue is
what consequences should follow from the pre-proceedings destruction of
documents. The fact that adverse consequences, such as the striking out of the
defence, may follow in a civil proceeding from the destruction of documents by a
party does not mean that the party did not have a ‘right’ to manage its own
documents.
This distinction is best illustrated by example. A party may anticipate that one
of the consequences of destroying documents prior to the commencement of
anticipated proceedings may be the striking out of all, or parts, of its defence. It
may calculate that to be a bad outcome, but may nevertheless choose to take its
chances. It may want the documents never to see the light of day for both legal
and public relations reasons; it may expect to settle the case for an outcome more
favourable than if the documents had been available; or it may estimate the
possibility of being sued, or of the defence being struck out in the event of
litigation, as low enough to take its chances; and so on.51 If the litigation does
eventuate, and the court finds that the plaintiff is, because of the destruction of
documents, unable to prove all or part of its case, and the court does strike out
the defence or parts of the defence in order to do justice between the parties, it
cannot sensibly be said that the party did not have the ‘right’ to manage its
documents as it wanted or even that its ‘right’ to do so was restricted.52 Rather, it
chose to do certain things with its documents and certain consequences (but not
sanctions) followed.
In the example just given, the defendant has effectively gambled and lost. But
one can imagine a case in which the consequences that follow from the destruction of documents may not even be adverse to the defendant in the defendant’s
own calculation. If the plaintiff’s claim is a small one, say for $10 000, and the
defendant estimates the adverse publicity likely to follow from public disclosure
of the contents of the documents as likely to cause $500 000 damage to its
business, it may be perfectly happy with its decision to destroy the documents. It
exercised its ‘right’ to manage its documents by destroying them, certain consequences followed, and the defendant is pleased with its decision. Equally, it could
have exercised its ‘right’ to manage the documents by retaining them, but it
calculated their destruction to be to its advantage.53
In the authors’ view, the Court’s failure to appreciate this distinction demo nstrates its misconception of the questions before it. Both Eames J and the Court
of Appeal ought only to have been concerned with doing justice between the
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Delbridge et al, above n 44, 1625.
See, eg, the discussion of the Ford Pinto case in David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An
Ethical Study (1988) 206–10.
52 In the absence, that is, of independent proceedings brought to punish the defendant for
the destruction.
53 It may be that the consequences resulting from the destruction of documents are likely to
be more adverse to the defendant in McCabe v BAT than to the hypothesised defendant
here — eg, because there is likely to be more than one plaintiff and/or damages are likely
to be large in amount. But numbers of prospective plaintiffs or amounts of likely damages
cannot make any substantive difference to matters of principle. These simply define the
consequences of the defendant’s decision to manage its own documents in certain ways;
they do not evidence denial or restriction of its right to do so.

plaintiff and defendant in the negligence proceeding — not examining issues
concerning the defendant’s ‘right’ to deal at will, free from criminal sanction, with
documents relevant to anticipated litigation. The resolution of the former was the
matter that attracted the court’s jurisdiction; the resolution of the latter would
only occur in the event that criminal proceedings were instituted against the
defendant for an attempt to pervert the course of justice or contempt of court.
IV T H E CR I M I N A L O FFENCES OF A T T E M P T I N G T O P ERVERT THE
COURSE OF J USTICE AND CO N T E M P T O F COURT
A The Nature of the Offences
That the Court of Appeal in BAT v Cowell saw the facts as giving rise to serious issues concerning the sanctions that could be imposed upon those who had
destroyed documents is hardly surprising. It is undisputed that the defendant
destroyed documents knowing that many of those documents would be relevant
in proceedings such as McCabe v BAT and would be evidence in any trial of the
issues. Evidence is essential to the exercise by judges of judicial power, that is,
their fact-finding and decision-making functions.54 Its destruction is therefore a
serious matter. The criminal offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice
was created to punish conduct which impairs the capacity of courts to perform
the role for which they exist. In Victoria, attempting to pervert the course of
justice is a level two offence, carrying the penalties of imprisonment for up to 25
years 55 or a fine of up to $300 000.56
Though the Court of Appeal spoke of both attempt to pervert the course of
justice and contempt of court as criteria for intervention, it suffices here to focus
on the former. To the extent that the two offences may both apply to the destruction of documents, there appears to be no substantial distinction between them.
In R v Rogerson,57 McHugh J noted Archbold’s view58 that ‘the offence of
perverting the course of justice is merely contempt under another name’.59 In
Meissner v The Queen,60 Dawson J described the offence of attempting to pervert
the course of justice as ‘a form of contempt under another name’.61
54
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See above Parts I and II(A).
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 320.
Level two offences carry a maximum penalty of 3000 penalty units, where one penalty
unit equates to $100: Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 109(2), 110.
(1992) 174 CLR 268 (‘Rogerson’).
S G Mitchell, P J Richardson and D A Thomas, Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence
and Practice (43 rd ed, 1988) vol 2, 2463.
(1992) 174 CLR 268, 303.
(1995) 184 CLR 132 (‘Meissner’).
Ibid 156, citing P J Richardson (ed), Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice
(44 th ed, 1992) vol 2, [28-118].
See also R v McLachlan [1998] 2 VR 55, in which Byrne J explained both the actus reus
(at 59) and the mens rea (at 67) of the offence of criminal contempt in terms used for an
attempt to pervert the course of justice; DPP v Johnson [2002] VSC 583 (Unreported,
Osborn J, 20 December 2002) [9].
It might be argued that the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice requires
an intent that is not required for contempt: see Lane v Registrar of Supreme Court of New
South Wales (1981) 148 CLR 245, 258 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Murphy, Wilson and Brennan
JJ); Hinch v A-G (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15, 46–7 (Deane J), 69–70 (Toohey J), 85 (Gaudron J); A-G (NSW) v Dean (1990) 20 NSWLR 650, 655–6 (Gleeson CJ, Kirby P and

It is beyond controversy that the offence of attempting to pervert the course of
justice may apply to the destruction of documents prior to the commencement of
civil proceedings. First, it is clear that the offence applies to conduct engaged in
where no proceedings are yet on foot.62 Second, the accepted formulations of the
offence would apply to the destruction of evidence or of material that may
otherwise become evidence in a proceeding. The offence consists of doing an act
that has a tendency, and is intended, to pervert the course of justice or the
administration of public justice, whether in relation to criminal or civil proceedings.63
In Rogerson, Mason CJ, speaking in relation to criminal proceedings, said that
an act which deflects the police ‘from adducing evidence of the true facts’ would,
if done with the requisite intent, constitute an attempt to pervert the course of
justice.64 Brennan and Toohey JJ referred specifically to ‘denying [a court]
knowledge of the relevant law or of the true circumstances of the case’.65 In the
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Priestley JA). The better view seems to be that whether or not a particular intent is required for contempt of court will depend on the type of contempt. In cases of publication
by the media of material that has a tendency to interfere with the administration of justice by impairing the capacity of a party to obtain a fair trial, ordinarily it will not need
to be shown that the publisher intended to interfere with the administration of justice: see,
eg, Hinch v A-G (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15; A-G (NSW) v Dean (1990) 20 NSWLR 650.
But for other types of contempt, such as contact between a party and a witness or potential witness, an intention to interfere with the administration of justice may be required.
In R v McLachlan [1998] 2 VR 55, Byrne J held that the prosecution in such a case ‘must
establish to the criminal standard that the alleged contemnor had at the relevant time, an
intention to pervert the course of justice’: at 67. His Honour drew (at 67–8) on Meissner
and Rogerson — cases in which the accused were charged with attempting to pervert the
course of justice, in relation to which the relevant intent is clearly required — to explain
the nature of the mens rea required for the conviction of the accused in the case before
him on the charge of contempt of court. In a subsequent case, A-G (Vic) v Rich [1998]
VSC 41 (Unreported, Byrne J, 21 August 1998), his Honour doubted whether the court
‘should be concerned with an inquiry as to what was the actual purpose of the contemnor’,
though he found it unnecessary to express a concluded view on the controversy: at [16].
See also A-G v Butterworth [1963] 1 QB 696, 723 (Lord Denning MR), 725–6 (Donovan
LJ); Deen, Decentius v Stronghearts Pty Ltd (1998) 8 Tas R 432 (Slicer J); Prothonotary v
Hirata [2000] NSWSC 106 (Unreported, James J, 10 March 2000).
Where conduct is of the kind described here (ie, destruction of relevant material) and both
offences would appear to apply, and where the offence of attempting to pervert the
course of justice would require an intent to interfere with the administration of justice, the
arguments in favour of requiring such an intention for contempt of court will be strong.
Otherwise, the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice would be redundant
in relation to the very sort of conduct to which one would expect it typically to apply.
In Rogerson (1992) 174 CLR 268, 277, Mason CJ said:
It is well established at common law and under cognate statutory provisions that the offence of attempting or conspiring to pervert the course of justice at a time when no curial proceedings are on foot can be committed. That is because action taken before curial or tribunal proceedings commence may have a tendency and be intended to frustrate
or deflect the course of curial or tribunal proceedings which are imminent, probable or
even possible.
See also at 281 (Brennan and Toohey JJ), 305 (McHugh J).
Note that the Court of Appeal expressed some doubt as to whether contempt of court
could apply before proceedings have been instituted but found the issue unnecessary to
examine. Their Honours stated that ‘[c]ertainly, there can be an attempt to pervert the
course of justice before a proceeding is on foot, as R v Rogerson demonstrates, and that,
we think, provides a satisfactory criterion in the present instance’: BAT v Cowell [2002]
VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6 December 2002) [173] (cit ations omitted).
See below n 71 and accompanying text.
(1992) 174 CLR 268, 278.
Ibid 280.

most comprehensive Australian judicial statement of the nature of the offence,
Brennan and Toohey JJ said:
Justice, as the law understands it, consists in the enjoyment of rights and
the suffering of liabilities by persons who are subject to the law to an extent
and in a manner which accords with the law applicable to the actual circumstances of the case. The course of justice consists in the due exercise by a
court or comp etent judicial authority of its jurisdiction to enforce, adjust or
declare the rights and liabilities of persons subject to the law in accordance
with the law and the actual circumstances of the case. The course of justice
is perverted (or obstructed) by impairing (or preventing the exercise of)
the capacity of a court or competent judicial authority to do justice. The
ways in which a court or competent judicial authority may be impaired in
(or prevented from exercising) its capacity to do justice are various. Those
ways comprehend, in our opinion, erosion of the integrity of the court or
competent judicial authority, hindering of access to it, deflecting applications that would be made to it, denying it knowledge of the relevant law or
of the true circumstances of the case, and impeding the free exercise of its
jurisdiction and powers including the powers of executing its decisions.66
Later their Honours said that ‘[t]he gravamen of the offence of an attempt to
pervert the course of justice is an interference with the due exercise of jurisdiction
by courts and other competent judicial authorities.’67
B The Criminal Offence Is an Inappropriate Criterion for Intervention:
Tendency, Not Effect
That the Court of Appeal, in the authors’ view, misconceived the nature of the
questions before it is further evidenced by the fact that, while it held an attempt
to pervert the course of justice (or contempt of court) to be ‘the criterion’ for
intervention beyond the drawing of adverse inferences, it did not consider the
nature or elements of the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice (or
contempt of court). If the Court had considered what the offence of attemp ting to
pervert the course of justice (or contempt of court) is, it may have recognised its
inappropriateness as the criterion for the court’s intervention. Other than to say
that ‘[c]ertainly, there can be an attempt to pervert the course of justice before a
proceeding is on foot, as R v Rogerson demonstrates’,68 the Court of Appeal did
not once mention that case (the primary Australian authority on attempting to
pervert the course of justice) or any other case on attempting to pervert the
course of justice (or contempt of court).69
The substance of the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice is
made clear in Rogerson.70 Mason CJ said that ‘[a]n attempt [to] pervert the
course of justice consists in the doing of some act which has a tendency and is
66
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Ibid (emphasis added).
Ibid 284. Where a party’s dealings with its documents may interfere with ‘the due exercise
of jurisdiction by courts’, its ‘right’ to manage its documents is restricted by the law, and a
criminal sanction is imposed for contravention.
68 BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6
December 2002) [173] (citations omitted).
69 Save for a reference (‘See also’) to Meissner in a footnote to Rogerson: BAT v Cowell
[2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6 December 2002) fn
215.
70 (1992) 174 CLR 268.

intended to pervert the administration of public justice’.71 The offence has two
elements: that the act have a ‘tendency’ to pervert the course of justice, and be
done with an ‘intent’ to pervert the course of justice. What is clear is that, in order
for the offence to be committed, it need not be shown that the act did, in fact,
pervert the course of justice; only that it had a ‘tendency’ to do so. That a
tendency to pervert the course of justice is the criterion for the criminal offence is
understandable. If a person intends to pervert the course of justice and their
conduct has a ‘tendency’ to achieve that end, that ought to be punishable
without also proving that the conduct actually did achieve that result. It is the
conduct (and the requisite intent) that merit punishment. Whether the conduct
does or does not ultimately pervert the course of justice may well be entirely
beyond the control of the actor. 72
A similar point may be made with respect to intention. One can readily understand why intention might be an element of the criminal offence. But why should
it be a criterion for intervention by the court in a civil proceeding? If, for example,
a party’s recklessness or negligence creates a situation where a fair trial is
impossible, such that intervention by the court is necessary to protect the
integrity of the civil proceeding, surely the court can intervene in an appropriate
manner, even though intention to pervert the course of justice cannot be established.73
Neither of these criteria — tendency or intention — serves as a useful prerequisite for intervention where the issue is what ought to follow, in a civil proceeding, from the destruction of evidence. The issue for the court in a civil proceeding
is what is, in fact, the effect in the instant proceeding of the destruction of
evidence. The ‘tendency’ of the destruction to affect the civil proceeding is not
the issue. The role of the court in a civil proceeding is to do justice between the
parties in the case before it. The court must be concerned only with the actual
effect of the destruction of documents; how has the destruction affected the
court’s capacity to adjudicate a dispute ‘about rights and obligations arising from
the operation of the law upon past events or conduct.’74 If, for example, a party
destroyed all relevant documents, thinking they were the only copies of such
documents, but a copy of each document had surreptitiously been made by an
71
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164 CLR 15, 34 (Wilson J) where his Honour said that contempt of court will be made
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73 See discussion in above n 61.
74 Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167, 188. See the discussion in
above Part I. The fact that the court should be concerned only with the effect of the
destruction of documents in the case it is adjudicating does not mean that it must turn a
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employee and was available to the other party and to the court, what relevance
could that destruction possibly have in the civil proceeding between the two
parties? It may yet be punishable as an attempt to pervert the course of justice,
but that is another thing entirely. The same may be said of an unsuccessful
attempt to intimidate a witness, or to bribe a judge or juror, or to destroy a judge’s
notes of proceedings. Clearly, these all have a ‘tendency’ to pervert the course of
justice and are punishable, but if they are unsuccessful, what relevance can they
have to the civil proceeding between the parties?
Had the Court of Appeal in BAT v Cowell considered the elements of the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice (or contempt of court), it may
have seen its inappropriateness as ‘a criterion’ for intervention, let alone as ‘the
criterion’ for intervention. Its failure to do so further underlines that it saw the
case before it as one about sanctions to be imposed against a party, rather than
doing justice between the two parties to the civil proceeding. If the case had been
about sanctions, the Court would have been justified in simply referring to the
offence, as it did, and saying, as it said, that because the argument had not been
made below, the Court would not express a view on whether the conduct did or
did not constitute an offence.75 But in a negligence proceeding, in which the
Court was required to find the facts and do justice between the parties, such an
approach was, in the authors’ view, erroneous. It led to a result in which the ‘test’
for the Court’s intervention in a civil proceeding was not even informed by the
question of whether a trial of the issues could be fair in the circumstances, in the
absence of that intervention. This is despite the Court of Appeal’s recognition
elsewhere in its judgment that, ‘[o]f course what is a ‘fair trial’ must inform any
test which is adopted’, though it could not ‘stand in place of one.’76 The Court of
Appeal’s approach may be contrasted with the judgment of Eames J, for whom
the possibility (or impossibility) of fairness of a trial was crucial. His Honour said:
Once it is concluded, as I have concluded, that the plaintiff has been denied
a fair trial, in circumstances which cannot be adequately redressed, then in
my opinion there is no point in attempting to quantify the extent of the unfairness. A trial is either fair or it is not. Unless all unfairness which the defendant has created can now be removed then a verdict by the jury in favour
of the plaintiff would not demonstrate that the unfairness in the trial had
been eliminated, but merely that the plaintiff had succeeded despite the unfairness of her trial. If it is necessary for me to be satisfied that there would
remain a substantial risk of injustice to the plaintiff if the trial proceeds, even
after further orders are made in an attempt to alleviate her disadvantage,
then I am so satisfied.77
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C Plaintiff Should Not Be Required to Prove the Commission of a Criminal
Offence
Ordinarily, allegations of criminal conduct are pursued by the police and Directors of Public Prosecutions, who have the resources to investigate and prosecute
such allegations. Why should plaintiffs be required to take on this role in order to
obtain a just outcome in a civil proceeding which is essentially about other issues
(for example, negligence or loss) and to devote their limited resources towards
doing so? A plaintiff’s concern is to have his or her claim heard, and for the court
to intervene appropriately where the destruction of documents by the defendant
has prejudiced the plaintiff’s capacity to prove his or her case.
V P RE -P ROCEEDINGS D E S T R U C T I O N A N D T H E P OSSIBILITY OF A FAIR
T RIAL
A Introduction
McCabe v BAT proceeded at both the trial and appeal levels on the basis that
there was no case authority directly on point. The parties referred to and relied on
various English cases,78 but in those cases the conduct that gave rise to the
failure to comply with discovery obligations or to produce relevant documents
occurred after, not before, proceedings had commenced. Notwithstanding this
factual difference, however, one fundamental principle resonates in those English
authorities that can also shed light on issues raised by the pre-proceedings
destruction of documents — the crucial connection between the possibility (or
impossibility) of a fair trial and the courts’ intervention.
B The English Cases
In Coleman v Dunlop Ltd,79 the plaintiff sued for damages for repetitive strain
injury allegedly sustained during the course of his employment at the defendant’s
factory. The trial judge struck out the defence on liability and entered judgment
for the plaintiff because the defendants had failed to provide proper discovery of
documents relevant to liability. The trial judge asked whether it would be possible
for there to be a fair trial notwithstanding the absence of the documents, and
concluded that it would not be possible because the missing documents went to
the core of the plaintiff’s case.80 The decision was affirmed by the English Court
of Appeal. Judge LJ stated:

The fact that the plaintiff might well overcome the prejudice to a fair trial which the
defendant has created is no answer, in my opinion, to this applicatio n. Success under
those circumstances would merely demonstrate that the plaintiff’s claim had merit. The
defendant’s decision to destroy documents was predicated on the fact that a claim
brought by a plaintiff at a later time might well have merit and could succeed unless
steps were taken to deny a fair trial to the plaintiff. Failure of a claim where a plaintiff
had been denied a fair trial, could never be shown to be a just result.
At [379].
78 American authorities were also discussed, mainly in the context of the tort of spoliation.
That tort was rejected as having no relevance in Australia and the cases were not relied
on. Those authorities are therefore not discussed in this article.
79 (Unreported, English Court of Appeal, Judge LJ and Lord Lloyd, 20 October 1999).
80 Ibid 3.

The judge of course reminded herself of the relevant principles and, in particular, that the order being sought was not to be made merely to strike out a
defence as a matter of punishment, but constantly to bear in mind that what
she was deciding objectively is whether it would be possible to conduct a
fair trial of the liability issue, which — of course it may now have been forgotten — was about the speed and weight at which the plaintiff was required to perform repetitious movements.81
It is true, as the Court of Appeal in BAT v Cowell observed, that this ‘case says
nothing about documents destroyed prior to the commencement of the proceeding, let alone the deliberate destruction of documents with a view to prejudicing a
prospective plaintiff.’82 But Coleman v Dunlop Ltd did say something important
about — in fact, appears to have turned upon — the impossibility of a fair trial.
This point was not lost on the Court of Appeal in BAT v Cowell; it acknowledged
that the reason for the strike out in Coleman v Dunlop Ltd was that a fair trial was
not possible. Yet the possibility (or impossibility) of a fair trial does not inform the
Court of Appeal’s ‘test’ for intervention.
The possibility of a fair trial was also identified as the appropriate criterion of
intervention in Logicrose Ltd v Southend United Football Club Ltd [No 1].83 In
that case, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s principal director and shareholder, and also its principal witness, had failed to disclose the existence of a
crucial document in his possession or power and, having obtained it during the
course of the trial, had deliberately concealed its existence from the defendant
and the Court.84 The trial judge, Millett J, was not satisfied that the allegation was
established. His Lordship said:
Deliberate disobedience of a peremptory order for discovery is no doubt a
contempt and, if proved in accordance with the criminal standard of proof,
may, in theory at least, be visited with a fine or imprisonment. But to debar
the offender from all further part in the proceedings and to give judgment
against him accordingly is not an appropriate response by the Court to contempt.
It may, however, be an appropriate response to a failure to comply with the
rules relating to discovery, even in the absence of a specific order of the
Court, and so in the absence of any contempt, not because that conduct is
deserving of punishment but because the failure has rendered it impossible
to conduct a fair trial or would make any judgment in favour of the offender
unsafe.
In my view a litigant is not to be deprived of his right to a proper trial as a
penalty for his contempt or his defiance of the Court, but only if his conduct
has amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court which would render
any further proceedings unsatisfactory and prevent the Court from doing
justice. Before the Court takes that serious step, it needs to be satisfied that
there is a real risk of this happening.85
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Millett J was clearly making the point that consequences in a civil proceeding
— such as debarring a party from further participation in the proceeding — could
only be imposed by reference to the possibility or impossibility of the trial being
fair, and not to punish the default. His Lordship’s reliance on fairness as the
relevant criterion, and concomitant rejection of punishment, was certainly not lost
on the Court of Appeal in BAT v Cowell. In its discussion of Logicrose, the Court
stated:
But his Lordship [Millett J in Logicrose] added that he ‘would in any event,
have refused to accede to this application once the missing document had
been produced’, because the object of Order 24 Rule 16 is ‘not to punish the
offender for his conduct but to secure the fair trial of the action in accordance with the due process of the Court’. Millett J was satisfied that there
was no risk of injustice if the trial was allowed to continue. He said:
The deliberate and successful suppression of the material document is
a serious abuse of the process of the court and may well merit the exclusion of the offender from all other participation in the trial. The reason is that it makes the fair trial of the action impossible to achieve and
any judgment in favour of the offender unsafe. But if the threat of such
exclusion produces the missing document, then the object of Order 24
Rule 16 is achieved.86
The Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiff’s reliance on the above quote
because Millett J ‘was speaking in the context of a document allegedly coming to
hand in the course of the trial, and, indeed, during cross examination’, rather than
‘the suppression of documents before the commencement of the proceeding.’87
The important aspect of what Millett J was saying, however, was his use of the
criterion of fairness of the trial to determine what the consequences of a failure to
produce documents should be in a particular case.88
A similar case is Landauer Ltd v Comins & Co.89 In that case, the plaintiffs had
breached their discovery obligations because a number of relevant documents
that were not at first listed by the plaintiffs as part of discovery were subsequently destroyed.90 The plaintiffs did not knowingly destroy the documents;
they destroyed files in which the documents were kept without first having
checked if the documents were relevant in the proceedings already on foot. The
trial judge struck out the plaintiffs’ claim for failure to comply with discovery
requirements. The defendants had relied on r 24.16(1) of the Rules of the Supreme
86
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BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6
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Compare this to the emphasis given by the Court of Appeal (ibid [150]) to the sentence
from Logicrose: ‘But to debar the offender from all further part in the proceedings and to
give judgment against him accordingly is not an appropriate response by the Court to
contempt.’ This sentence was italicised in the Court of Appeal’s judgment, suggesting that
the Court found it particularly significant, notwithstanding that Millett J’s next sentence,
as reproduced by the Court of Appeal (at [150]), said:
It may, however, be an appropriate response to a failure to comply with the rules relat ing to discovery, even in the absence of a specific order of the Court, and so in the absence of any contempt, not because that conduct is deserving of punishment but because
the failure has rendered it impossible to conduct a fair trial or would make any judgment
in favour of the offender unsafe.
(Unreported, English Court of Appeal, Lloyd and Farquharson LJJ and Sir John Megaw, 14
May 1991).
Ibid 2.

Court 1965 (UK) which, upon default in compliance with the requirements for
discovery, authorised the court to ‘make such order as it thinks just, including, in
particular, an order that the action be dismissed or … that the defence be struck
out and judgment be entered accordingly.’ The plaintiffs’ appeal on the ground
that the trial judge’s exercise of discretion had miscarried was dismissed. Lloyd LJ
stated: ‘It was common ground that the question [the trial judge] had to ask
himself was whether there was a real or substantial or serious risk that a fair trial
was no longer possible.’91 Here, again, the centrality of the fairness of the trial is
evident.
The Court of Appeal in BAT v Cowell distinguished this case, as it did
Logicrose and Coleman v Dunlop Ltd, on the basis that the case was not
concerned with pre-proceedings destruction of documents. It stated:
Thus again, the case says nothing about the destruction of documents before the commencement of proceedings. It raises an interesting question
about the proper test where essential documents are destroyed in consequence of which a fair trial may no longer be possible, particularly if that
conduct is not deliberate but inadvertent (or as in Coleman accidental) and
it suggests that the test of fair trial may not always be helpful.92
In the authors’ view, this last sentence reflects a misunderstanding of what
Lloyd LJ said. His Lordship, as the Court of Appeal quoted, said:
There was, however, some discussion in argument before us as to what
would have been the position if the documents had been destroyed in
knowing disregard of the plaintiffs’ obligation as to discovery. I find some
difficulty in seeing how, if the sole question is whether a fair trial can still be
held, the conduct of the plaintiffs in destroying the documents, whether it
was merely inadvertent or whether it was in knowing disregard of their obligation as to discovery and therefore more blameworthy, can be fitted into
the equation. But the question does not arise in the present case. It will need
careful consideration when it does aris e.93
Lloyd LJ’s comments did not, as the Court of Appeal in BAT v Cowell thought,
suggest ‘that the test of fair trial may not always be helpful.’94 Rather, it questioned how the blameworthiness (deliberateness or inadvertence) was relevant to
the central question of the fairness of the trial.
Arrow Nominees Inc v Blackledge95 is another instructive case. The respondents applied for an order striking out a petition because of an attempt by one Mr
Tobias, who controlled one of the petitioners, to pervert the course of justice by
the production on discovery of documents that he knew to be forged. The
petition was struck out because there was a substantial risk that the allegations
were incapable of a fair trial as a result of the production on discovery of forged
documents. Chadwick LJ stated
91
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95 [2000] 2 BCLC 167 (‘Arrow Nominees’).

that the object of the rules as to discovery is to secure the fair trial of the action in accordance with the due process of the court; and that, accordingly,
a party is not to be deprived of his right to a proper trial as a penalty for disobedience of those rules, even if such disobedience amounts to contempt
for or defiance of the court, if that object is ultimately secured, by (for exa mple) the late production of a document which has been withheld.96
His Lordship continued:
But where a litigant’s conduct puts the fairness of the trial in jeopardy,
where it is such that any judgment in favour of the litigant would have to be
regarded as unsafe, or where it amounts to such an abuse of the process of
the court as to render further proceedings unsatisfactory and to prevent the
court from doing justice, the court is entitled, indeed I would hold bound, to
refuse to allow that litigant to take further part in the proceedings and
(where appropriate) to determine the proceedings against him. The reason,
as it seems to me, is that it is no part of the court’s function to proceed to
trial if to do so would give rise to a substantial risk of injustice. The function
of the court is to do justice between the parties; not to allow its process to
be used as a means of achieving injustice. A litigant who has demonstrated
that he is determined to pursue proceedings with the object of preventing a
fair trial has forfeited his right to take part in a trial. His object is inimical to
the process which he purports to invoke.97
Chadwick LJ concluded:
In my view, having heard and disbelieved the evidence of Nigel Tobias as to
the extent of his fraudulent conduct, and having reached the conclusion (as
he did) that Nigel Tobias was persisting in his object of frustrating a fair trial,
the judge ought to have considered whether it was fair to the respondents,
and in the interests of the administration of justice generally, to allow the
trial to continue. If he had considered that question, then, as it seems to me,
he should have come to the conclusion that it must be answered in the
negative.98
Again, the fairness of the trial lay at the heart of Arrow Nominees. And again,
the case was distinguished by the Court of Appeal in BAT v Cowell on the
ground that it ‘says nothing directly about conduct, such as the destruction of
documents, before the commencement of the proceeding.’99 Yet again, the
importance of fairness of the trial was overlooked by the Court of Appeal and is
absent from its test for intervention. This may be contrasted with Chadwick LJ’s
comment, not reproduced in the Court of Appeal’s decision, that:
To suggest that the basis on which the court acts, when deciding to strike
out a petition on the ground that there is a substantial risk that a fair trial has
become impossible as the result of a petitioner’s conduct, is founded upon
the court’s determination that a petitioner of whose conduct it disapproves
should be denied discretionary relief is to misunderstand the position in a
fundamental respect. The court does not strike out the petition because it
disapproves of the petitioner’s conduct; it strikes out the petition because it
is satisfied that the petitioner’s conduct has led to an unacceptable risk that
any judgment in his favour will be unsafe.100
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Though the concept of a fair trial was central in these English authorities, the
Court’s treatment of the concept of fair trial in BAT v Cowell occupies only the
following paragraph:
The judge here was disposed to accept a ‘fair trial’ as constituting the relevant criterion, but when documents are destroyed before the commencement
of a proceeding, that test is less than helpful. After all, what is a ‘fair trial’?
According to the defendant, there is a fair trial if, according to the rules of
court and the obligations of the parties to the court, the court adjudicates
upon the documents put in evidence and the oral testimony of the witnesses
during the hearing. Of course what is a ‘fair trial’ must inform any test
which is adopted, but it cannot stand in place of one.101
While the treatment of this central issue is surprisingly sparse — essentially, it
consists of one rhetorical question and the setting out of one submission by the
defendant — the Court did say that what is a fair trial must inform any test which
is adopted, even if it cannot stand in place of such a test. Indeed, it is difficult to
conclude otherwise than that what is a fair trial must inform any test which is
adopted. However, what is a fair trial did not at all inform the test ultimately
adopted by the Court of Appeal.102
C Application of These Principles to Pre-Proceedings Destruction of
Documents
A trial judge faced with the destruction of documents in a particular case has to
determine what the consequences of the documents’ destruction should be. If the
appropriate test of the court’s intervention in a situation of post-commencement
destruction is whether a fair trial is still possible, it is also an appropriate test
where the destruction occurred in the pre-proceedings phase. Considered in the
light of the nature of the judicial function in a civil proceeding,103 and the
fundamental purpose of discovery,104 the possibility of a fair trial should also be
the criterion for judicial intervention when documents are destroyed prior to the
commencement of litigation.
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[2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6 December 2002) [172]
(emphasis added).
The Court’s approach was made complete when it concluded that none of the prejudice
suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the destruction of documents mattered at all unless
the defendant had been shown to have breached an ‘obligation’ with respect to those
documents. The Court referred to Eames J’s view that the prejudice from the destruction
of documents was ‘very considerable’, and then listed a number of aspects of prejudice
that his Honour had identified: ‘the prejudice to the plaintiff might be immense by virtue
of the deliberate destruction of just one document, which might have been decisive in her
case’; it would ‘be interesting to know … how many of the Cremona documents had been
rated 5 (a “knockout” blow for the plaintiff) and how many of those had been discovered
in this case’; and ‘the plaintiff’s anxiety that she may have been denied at least one
“knockout” document, if not many’: McCabe v BAT [2002] VSC 73 (Unreported, Eames
J, 22 March 2002) [309].The Court said ‘[t]hese comments lose significance if, as already
concluded, the defendant was not shown to have been in breach of any obligation in destroying documents before the commencement of this proceeding — or, more accurately,
any relevant obligation as the matter was argued’: BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6 December 2002) [185].
103 See above Part I.
104 See above Part II.
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VI T H E CO R R E C T Q U E S T I O N A N D T H E CO R R E C T A NSWER
A The Relationship between Fairness and a Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction
The question that courts ought to ask when relevant documents have been
destroyed at a time when litigation was anticipated (and which has already been
stated above) is this:
What consequences should, or may, follow, in a civil proceeding, from the
destruction of documents by the defendant, prior to the filing of the proceeding by the plaintiff, at a time when the defendant anticipated litigation
of the kind brought by the plaintiff, and where that destruction of documents has caused prejudice in the proceeding to the plaintiff? And, in particular, can such destruction of documents justify an order striking out the
defendant’s defence, or parts of the defendant’s defence?
The answer to that question, as the authors have said, must lie in a consideration of the effect of the destruction of documents on the court’s capacity to
exercise judicial power: to find the facts, to apply the law to those facts, and to do
justice between the parties.105 The central concerns at issue here may be expressed in different ways: ‘whether it would be possible to conduct a fair trial’; 106
whether a ‘fair trial of the action [is] impossible to achieve and any judgment in
favour of the offender unsafe’; 107 whether it is ‘impossible to conduct a fair trial’
or any judgment in favour of the ‘offending’ party would be ‘unsafe’; 108 whether
further proceedings would be ‘unsatisfactory’ and the conduct ‘prevent[s] the
Court from doing justice’; 109 whether there is a ‘real or substantial or serious risk
that a fair trial [is] no longer possible’; 110 whether there is an ‘unacceptable risk’
that a judgment ‘will be unsafe’; 111 or whether ‘the fairness of the trial [has been
put] in jeopardy’.112 The possibility or impossibility of a fair trial (and the
corresponding risk of an unsafe outcome) is central.113
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Arrow Nominees [2000] 2 BCLC 167, 195 (Chadwick LJ).
Ibid 194.
The Court of Appeal expressed concerns about the use of ‘fair trial’ as a criterion for
intervention. In doing so, it drew on the comments of McHugh J in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd
(1999) 198 CLR 180, 211–12 and Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1, 40–1: ‘McHugh J
has been very critical, more than once, of the concept of “fairness” standing as a crit erion … The concept of “fair trial”, particularly when divorced from the way in which a
current proceeding is being conducted, is surely capable of attracting like criticism’: BAT v
Cowell [2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6 December
2002) fn 210.
However, when McHugh J’s comments in these two cases are considered, in neither case
do they provide support for the Court of Appeal’s concerns.
In Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, McHugh J was cautioning against the use
of such notions as fairness, justice and morality as criteria for imposing a duty of care in a
negligence context as this would not help the negligence doctrine ‘escape the charge of
being riddled with indeterminacy’: at 212. But the idea of fairness here is a far cry from
what it means in the context of a ‘fair trial’. In the former, the concern is of the indeterminate notion of fairness being used as a criterion according to which the outcome is to

Such an approach is consistent with superior courts’ inherent power to control
their own procedures and to ensure that their processes are not used to achieve
injustice, and generally to prevent abuse of the process of the court.114 This
power is not derived from any written law or statute, ‘but from the very nature of
the court as a superior court of law, and for this reason such jurisdiction has been
called inherent.’115 One of the classic statements of the inherent jurisdiction of a
superior court is that of Lord Diplock, who described it as a court’s
general power to control its own procedure so as to prevent its being used
to achieve injustice. Such a power is inherent in its constitutional function
as a court of justice. Every civilized system of government requires that the
state should make available to all its citizens a means for the just and peaceful settlement of disputes between them as to their respective legal rights.
The means provided are courts of justice to which every citizen has a constitutional right of access in the role of plaintiff to obtain the remedy to which
he claims to be entitled in consequence of an alleged breach of his legal or
equitable rights by some other citizen, the defendant … So, it would stultify
the constitutional role of the High Court as a court of justice if it were not
armed with power to prevent its process being misused in such a way as to
diminish its capability of arriving at a just decision of the dispute.116

be determined. In the latter, fairness is as to the nature of the processes to be followed,
and is essentially used in a procedural sense: and, of course, the notion of procedural fairness is well-known to the law.
In Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1, McHugh J was not, in fact, critical of fairness as a
criterio n in all circumstances. His Honour, dealing with the issue of waiver of privilege,
distinguished between two categories of waiver: implied waiver, where it may be ‘unfair’
for a party to partially disclose privileged material and mislead by removing that material
from its context, and waiver by disclosure of material to a third party. His Honour
thought that the notion of fairness was relevant to the former category of waiver (‘In
such a case, there is a clear potential for unfairness arising out of the capacity of disclosed
material — which is part of an undisclosed whole — to mislead by reason of it being removed from its context’: at 34) but not to the latter. His Honour was not critical of the
concept of fairness being used as a criterion per se, but of it being used in a particular
context in which it was irrelevant. His Honour explained (at 35–9) why he thought that a
fairness test of waiver ‘in the context of determining whether voluntary disclosure by A to
B entitles A to assert privilege in the disclosed material as against C’ is contrary to, or not
supported by, the rationales of legal professional privilege: at 35 (emphasis added), but
immediately distinguished this category of case from that of partial disclosure.
Where documents have been destroyed by a party in anticipation of litigation, in such a
manner as to prejudice the capacity of the other party to obtain a fair trial, the situation
is much more closely analogous to a partial disclosure case. After all, the inevitable impact
is a trial (if it proceeds) in which only part of the ‘undisclosed whole’ is made available to
the other party and to the court. It is not a case of ‘general’ concepts of unfairness as
between the parties in dispute, but the specific unfairness of a trial in which only part of
the relevant evidence is available. In the authors’ view, McHugh J’s reasoning, when analysed, would actually support the use of the notion of ‘fairness’ as a highly relevant factor
in circumstances where relevant material is unavailable to the de cision-maker, at least
where it is unavailable as a result of the deliberate actions of one of the parties.
114 See the classic exposition by Sir Jack Jacob, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’
(1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23, 27.
115 Ibid.
116 Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corporation Ltd
[1981] AC 909, 997.

It is clear that Australian courts have the power to control and supervise proceedings, and that this power includes the power to take appropriate action to
prevent injustice.117 In Walton v Gardiner,118 Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ
referred to
the inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people.119
B Factors Influencing the Discretion to Intervene
If the court’s power to intervene where documents have been destroyed or are
otherwise unavailable is predicated on the need to prevent injustice arising from
the impossibility of a fair trial, as the authors have argued, the factors relevant to
the exercise of the discretion to intervene, and the nature of the intervention, can
be articulated. These factors would apply in a broadly similar manner regardless
of whether the destruction occurred in the pre-commencement or postcommencement stages. In a sense, the court’s task, once it has been established
that a fair trial cannot proceed because relevant material is unavailable, is to
apportion between the parties the consequences of the impossibility of a fair trial.
This will, in many cases, be a difficult task, but it is not one from which the court
can shy away. In performing this task, the court must be guided by notions of
fairness. At one end of the spectrum will be cases in which neither party is
responsible for the circumstances which have made a fair trial impossible, such as
where relevant material has been lost through accident. Cases like these will be
117
118
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[1982] AC 529, 536 (Lord Diplock). See also Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486,
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Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23, esp 25–6, 30–1 (Mason CJ), 71 (Toohey J), 74 (Gaudron J).
See Eames J’s various references to the inherent power of the court in McCabe v BAT
[2002] VSC 73 (Unreported, Eames J, 22 March 2002) [338], [339], [346], [360] and his
statement (at [367]) that:
In my opinion, the rules relating to discovery which I have cited, above, are not so inadequate, and the inherent powers of the Court are not so deficient, that, in the event
that no alternative course is reasonably open to remove the unfairness, the court must
require a plaintiff to participate in an unfair trial and seek to obtain a verdict, in those
circumstances, against a defendant whose actions rendered the trial unfair.
See also Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996 (Vic) r 24.05 entitled
‘Inherent Jurisdiction’, which provides:
Nothing in this Order [Judgment on Failure to Prosecute or Obey Order for Particulars
or Discovery] shall affect the inherent power of the Court to dismiss any proceeding for
want of prosecution or to order that upon the failure of a party to do any act or [to]
take any step which under these Rules he is required to do or take or to comply with an
order that he do any such act or take any such step the proceeding shall be dismissed or
the defence struck out and that judgment may be entered or that there be judgment accordingly.
Though the rule refers only to the dismissal of a proceeding or the striking out of a
defence ‘upon the failure of a party to do any act or [to] take any step which under these
Rules he is required to do or take or to comply with an order that he do any such act or
take any such step the proceeding’, it should not be read as restricting the court’s inherent
power to intervene to the circumstances described in the rule.

particularly difficult. At the other end of the spectrum will be cases in which one
party has deliberately brought those circumstances about, such as through the
deliberate destruction of relevant material. The consequences dictated by
considerations of fairness will, no doubt, be clearer in these types of cases.
In determining where along this spectrum a particular case falls, the court will
examine why the relevant material is unavailable. There are essentially four issues
that will be relevant here:
1

Whether the relevant materials are unavailable because of circumstances for
which one of the parties is responsible, either because:
(a)

the documents have been deliberately destroyed by one of the parties.
The concept of ‘deliberateness’ used here is as to the act of destruction,
rather than its intention or motive. That is, was the act of destruction an
intentional act, regardless of why it was engaged in? or

(b) the documents have been destroyed as a result of the recklessness or
negligence of one of the parties.
2

If the materials were deliberately destroyed by one of the parties, or destroyed
as a result of the recklessness or negligence of one of the parties, whether the
deliberate destruction or recklessness or negligence occurred at a time at
which proceedings of the kind ultimately brought were, or could reasonably
have been, anticipated.

3

If the materials were deliberately destroyed by one of the parties, whether
they were destroyed for the purpose of preventing their use by the other
party in litigation of the kind ultimately brought.

4

Where the materials are unavailable because of circumstances for which one
party is responsible, whether records of the now unavailable materials are also
unavailable, and whether they are unavailable for the same or similar reasons.

Though each of these factors will be important, the last may weigh particularly
heavily in the exercise of the discretion, at least where the destruction of both the
materials and the records of those materials was deliberate, and at a time when
proceedings were or might reasonably have been anticipated, because of the
requirements of r 29.04 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules
1996 (Vic). That rule requires that an affidavit of documents ‘for the purposes of
making discovery of documents’ shall (emphasis added):
(a) identify the documents which are or have been in the possession of the
party making the affidavit;
(b) enumerate the documents in convenient order and … describe each
document or, in the case of a group of documents of the same nature,
shall describe the group, sufficiently to enable the document or group to
be identified; and
(c) distinguish those documents which are in the possession of the party
making the affidavit from those that have been but are no longer in his
possession, and shall as to any document which has been but is no
longer in the possession of the party, state when he parted with the
document and his belief as to what has become of it.

In such a case, a party has deliberately placed itself in a position where it will be
unable to comply with orders for discovery once the anticipated proceedings
eventuate.120
The context in which a weighing up of the above factors must occur includes
consideration of what materials are unavailable (as far as this can be determined),
and how important the unavailable materials appear to be to the issues in dispute
between the parties. A decision to exercise the court’s inherent powers to protect
its processes and prevent injustice by striking out a defence, or parts of a
defence, can be justified by reference to factors such as those identified above,
considered in the context of the relevance and importance (as far as these can be
determined) of the unavailable materials to the issues in dispute between the
parties.121
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In such cases, the court may intervene not only by way of its inherent jurisdiction, but
also under r 24.02 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996 (Vic),
which provides that the court may dismiss a pleading or strike out a defence where a party
fails to comply with an order for the discovery of documents.
The Court of Appeal’s apparent lack of regard for the fact that not only had documents
been destroyed, but also records of the documents destroyed, is especially surprising in
light of the requirements of Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996 (Vic) r
29.04. The Court referred to Eames J’s finding that ‘[n]o record was kept, and delibe rately so, as to what documents had been destroyed’: BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197
(Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6 December 2002) [106], citing McCabe v
BAT [2002] VSC 73 (Unreported, Eames J, 22 March 2002) [289]. The Court thought
that ‘such conduct was surely no more than a reflection of the warning given in the manual in use at the conference at Kuala Lumpur [on records management]’: at [106]. That
warning was that there was ‘no point in disposing of a paper record only to find that the
same record is still being kept on a computer file or word processing disc’: at [103]. The
Court said (at [103]):
So much was surely self-evident and unexceptionable. The sting, for the judge, lay in the
tail [of the warning]: ‘especially if you have a discovery order served on your Company
by a court’. But given that the discovery for any large business organisation was likely
to be a most onerous task and one not lightly to be encouraged, the sting is no sting at
all. It is self-evident. It does not bespeak illegitimate purpose, although it plainly de monstrates an awareness of the problem.
See also the Court’s response to Eames J’s findings that not only had hard copies of
documents been destroyed, but also CD-ROMs on which some 30 000 documents had been
imaged before destruction. The Court said (at [109]) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
that
this may be seen to reflect, yet again, the warning mentioned in paragraph [103], that
there is not much point in destroying the hard document only to keep a record on computer if, as we think was the case, one at least of the problems facing the defendant in
litigation was the magnitude, expense and complexity of meeting any notice for general
discovery. As will be seen shortly, the Cremona litigation had demonstrated the difficulties and it was surely not surprising that, given that experience, the defendant, when destroying documents in March 1998, was at pains to destroy also the computer imaging
of the documents being destroyed. But again the point is peripheral on this appeal; for
while it is a question whether the destruction of documents generally constitutes a
breach of a defendant’s obligations though litig ation is yet to be commenced, the answer to that question is not affected by the failure to keep a record of what is destroyed.
It adds nothing save emphasis to the breach, if such it be; and if it be not a breach it
adds nothing at all.
Though the authors have argued throughout this article that the issue is not to be framed
in terms of ‘a defendant’s obligations’ with respect to the retention or destruction of
documents, the deliberate destruction also of the records of the documents destroyed must
be a highly relevant factor under any approach, given the requirements of Supreme Court
(General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996 (Vic) r 29.04. See BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197
(Unreported, Phillips, Batt and Buchanan JJA, 6 December 2002) [139] where the Court,
early in the section of its judgment dealing with the destruction of documents, assumed,
for the purposes of its reasoning, that no record was kept of what was destroyed in the
‘period of frantic activity’ following the lifting of the hold order in March 1998.
121 The Court of Appeal in BAT v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197 (Unreported, Phillips, Batt and
Buchanan JJA, 6 December 2002) [186]–[190] criticised Eames J on the ground that his

Finally, it should be emphasised that although the factors the authors have
identified relate to a party’s responsibility for the unavailability of the relevant
materials, and inevitably overlap with considerations relevant to the punishment
of a party for an attempt to pervert the course of justice or contempt of court,
they are not relevant in this context on the basis that they justify the punishment
of the party. Rather they are relevant because they are legitimate factors to guide
the exercise of discretion that seeks to apportion fairly between the parties the
consequences of the unavailability of the documents. Under the Court of Appeal’s approach, the power to intervene (beyond the drawing of adverse inferences) is enlivened only by proof of conduct deserving punishment. Under the
approach the authors have proposed, responsibility for the unavailability of the
documents may go to the exercise of discretion as to whether and how to
intervene. The power to intervene, however, is much broader, and is one to be
understood as it relates to the nature and rationale of the exercise of judicial
power. 122
In the authors’ view, the approach suggested here is to be preferred to that
applied by the Court of Appeal in BAT v Cowell not only for the reasons of
principle explained in this article, but also because it is likely to produce preferable outcomes in practice. First, there may be cases where a party deliberately
Honour had failed to sufficiently relate the destruction of documents in question to the
issues raised in the proceeding before him. The Court identified certain issues which it said
the plaintiff should not have been relieved of the burden of having to prove, including
that she smoked cigarettes, and that sh e smoked the defendant’s cigarettes. The Court said
(at [188]):
The remedy should have been related more directly to the prejudice seen to have been
suffered. With respect, the remedy adopted was out of proportion to the wrong, even if
the judge’s criticisms of the defendant’s conduct, both in relation to the order for discovery and the destruction of documents more generally, were to be accepted.
In the authors’ view, such an exercise (ie, relating the remedy to the prejudice) ought to be
performed by a court deciding these matters. Eames J performed such an exercise:
McCabe v BAT [2002] VSC 73 (Unreported, Eames J, 22 March 2002) [290]–[322],
[370]–[379]. See, in particular, his Honour’s conclusion (at [378]):
I do not consider that prejudice could have been removed entirely were the trial to proceed and were I [to] make attempts, as discussed above, to ameliorate the prejudice suffered by the plaintiff. That being so, I have concluded that it would be an inappropriate
course to adopt, to permit the trial to proceed, whether or not such a trial was by jury
or by judge alone.
If the Court’s view was that Eames J had gone too far, it ought to have carefully
considered how far he ought to have gone, rather than evading the question entirely on
the ground t hat the commission of a criminal offence had not been proved.
122 Though the authors have spoken throughout this article of the court’s capacity to strike
out a defence, or parts of a defence, in the circumstances we have described, we do not
mean to foreclose the possibility of courts adopting other, perhaps more creative, means
of intervention. One possibility is that a court may reverse the onus of proof in relation
to specific allegations to which the unavailable material is relevant. While we have not
found authority for such an approach, we note the statement of Lord Maugham in Joseph
Constantine Steamship Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corporation Ltd [1941] 2 All ER
165, 179 (emphasis added):
the burden of proof in any particular case depends on the circumstances in which the
claim arises. In general the rule which applies is Ei qui affirmat non ei qui negat incum bit probatio (the burden of proof lies on him who affirms, not on him who denies). It is
an ancient rule founded on considerations of good sense and should … not be departed
from without strong reasons.
Perhaps the destruction of relevant material by a defendant in anticipation of litigation
provides ‘strong reasons’ for a court to depart from the traditional approach in an effort
to do justice between the parties whose ‘controversies’ in relation to ‘rights relat[ing] to
life, liberty or property’ it is charged with deciding: Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v
Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ).

destroys documents, although it cannot be proved that it did so with an intent to
interfere with the administration of justice. In such cases, intervention by the
court, which may be desirable, would not be justified under the Court of Appeal’s
approach because the charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice (or
contempt of court) could not be made out. Second, the authors have argued for a
much broader and more flexible approach in which a court could consider all the
circumstances relevant to the unavailability of the documents and would not
need to fit these circumstances within the narrow confines dictated by the task of
proving the elements of specific criminal offences. The criminal test is thus
inappropriate not only for the reasons explained in this article, but also because it
is an unjustifiable fetter on the court’s inherent power to control its own process
and to ensure that its process is used to achieve justice between the parties.
C Why Adverse Inferences Are Not Enough
The authors have proposed an approach that allows courts to intervene, in
circumstances where documents have been destroyed, in a way that takes
account of, and seeks to respond to, the effect of the destruction of documents
on the capacity of courts to exercise judicial power. This broad approach is to be
preferred, for two reasons, to approaches such as those suggested by the
defendant in McCabe v BAT, which seek to limit the intervention of courts to the
drawing of adverse inferences against the party that has destroyed the documents.
First, if the possibility of fairness of the trial is the essential criterion, as the
authors have argued it should be, then approaches that would allow only the
drawing of adverse inferences suffer from one of the central flaws of the Court of
Appeal’s test. Such approaches focus on the state of mind of the party that
destroys the documents, rather than on the difficulties caused by the destruction
for the exercise of judicial power. Adverse inferences can only be drawn from the
destruction of documents where a party is held to have destroyed the documents
for the purpose of preventing their use in proceedings. No adverse inferences
may be drawn against a party where such a purpose is not found; yet the
prejudice suffered by the other party, and the impact on the court’s capacity to do
justice between the parties, is the same, independent of the state of mind of the
destroying party. In such a case the party prejudiced by the other party’s
destruction would be made to suffer, on its own, the consequences of the
destruction. There would be no way to apportion between the parties the
consequences of the unavailability of the documents.
Second, there will be cases where the documents destroyed would have been
so damaging to the interests of the party destroying them that the power of
adverse inferences will inevitably fall a long way short of the power that the
documents themselves would have had in the proceedings. In McCabe v BAT,
Eames J addressed such a problem. He held that it had to be assumed that the
defendant, in destroying the documents in the face of advice that adverse
inferences might be drawn against it, ‘regarded the damage which the defence
would suffer if the inferences were drawn against it, as being outweighed by the
extent of the damage which it would suffer if the plaintiff had access to the

documents.’123 His Honour held that ‘[p]ermitting the trial to proceed in [such]
circumstances could not remove the prejudice suffered by the plaintiff.’124
Indeed, under approaches that limit intervention to the drawing of adverse
inferences, a perverse dynamic is established: the more damaging the documents,
the greater the prejudice to the other party arising from their destruction, the
greater the damage to the court’s capacity to exercise judicial power, and the
greater the advantage to the party destroying them. 125
VII CONCLUSION
Evidence is essential to the effective exercise by courts of their fact-finding and
decision-making functions. In the absence of evidence, why bother with courts?
The process of discovery is one of the ways in which evidence is made available
in the civil litigation process. When relevant evidence is lost or destroyed, the
fact-finding process is compromised. Inevitably, so too is the ability of the court
to reach a just outcome.
Judges who find themselves in such a situation must decide how to deal with
the unavailability of relevant evidence. The authors have argued in this article
that the test which should be applied in such circumstances should focus on
whether a fair trial of the issues is still possible, notwithstanding the destruction
or loss of evidence. The authors have argued that such a criterion is entirely
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McCabe v BAT [2002] VSC 73 (Unreported, Eames J, 22 March 2002) [376].
Ibid.
In criminal law, the destruction of evidence by an accused may, in certain circumstances,
lead to an inference of ‘consciousness of guilt’, and the ‘guilty mind’ lead to an inference
of guilt of the offence charged: see Andrew Palmer, ‘Guilt and the Consciousness of Guilt:
The Use of Lies, Flight and Other “Guilty Behaviour” in the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime’ (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 95. In such a context, inferences are drawn from the destruction of evidence, rather than the accused person’s defence to the prosecution, or parts of the defence, being struck out.
The rationale for the difference in approach lies in the fundamental difference between
civil and criminal proceedings. In criminal proceedings, the court is charged with deciding
whether the prosecution, representing the state, has established, beyond reasonable doubt,
that the accused is guilty of the offence charged, with punishment to follow from a fin ding of guilt. The finding of guilt, and its consequences (including the potential deprivation
of liberty) are such grave matters that they may be imposed only where commission of
the offence charged is proved. The destruction of evidence may be suggestive of guilt (and
care must be taken in so finding in a particular case), but it cannot be used to supplant the
need to prove guilt. A civil proceeding, however, does not look at whether a party has
committed an offence against the state (and the community as a whole) that is worthy of
punishment, but at the resolution of controversies between parties in relation to their
rights and obligations. The notion of doing justice varies with the essence of the proceedings. Where one party destroys evidence in a civil proceeding, care must be taken to
ensure that the prejudiced party is not left without an adequate remedy. Further, in the
case of a criminal prosecution, the state will ordinarily be in a strong position to take
action against the accused in relation to the destruction of evidence, such as through a
prosecution for the very serious offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Any ‘loss’ suffered by the state as a result of the destruction of evidence of an accused is
different in nature from the loss suffered by a party to a civil proceeding where the other
destroys evidence. Where loss is different in nature, the appropriate remedy will ordinarily be different, too.
Chris Haan has reminded us that, in the criminal context, destruction of evidence by the
prosecution may well lead to the staying of proceedings. The staying of criminal proceedings is perhaps analogous to the striking out of a pleading in civil proceedings. Without
engaging in a detailed discussion of the different, as well as common, issues that are involved, the important point to make is that the appropriate response varies in accordance with the task the court is performing and the various public interests at stake.

consistent with the exercise of courts’ inherent powers to take appropriate action
to prevent injustice.
The authors have identified some of the key factors that should guide courts in
determining whether, and how, to intervene (such as by striking out a pleading or
parts of a pleading) in such cases. The reasons for the unavailability of the
evidence will be crucial. These include whether evidence has been deliberately
destroyed by a party, when and for what reason. The relevance of these factors is
not that they justify the punishment of a party for its conduct, but that they guide
the court in its attempt to apportion fairly between the parties the consequences
of the unavailability of the evidence.
The criterion of fairness is equally relevant to the destruction of evidence both
before and after the commencement of proceedings. That is because the role of a
court is to do justice between the parties in the case it is adjudicating, and that
role may be prejudiced equally by the destruction of evidence before commencement as after. This is not to say that the deliberate destruction of evidence either
in anticipation of or during proceedings is not a serious matter worthy of punis hment. Indeed, it is. It represents a fundamental attack on the role and rationale of
courts. However, its punishment ought to occur through the criminal offences of
attempting to pervert the course of justice and contempt of court, rather than in
the civil proceeding (or proceedings) it has prejudiced. In BAT v Cowell, the
Court of Appeal erroneously focused on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the
destruction of documents (an issue which had not been argued at trial) and lost
sight of the primary issue, namely the extent to which the destruction of evidence
had affected the plaintiff’s capacity to obtain a fair trial of her allegations.
In Arrow Nominees, Chadwick LJ remarked that:
[It] is no part of the court’s function to proceed to trial if to do so would give
rise to a substantial risk of injustice. The function of the court is to do justice between the parties; not to allow its process to be used as a means of
achieving injustice.126
This is the central consideration that should guide courts as they seek to resolve
the issues created by the unavailability of relevant evidence.
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